Among Nocera and McLean’s many criticisms of the government’s response to Covid-19, outlined in their recent book The big failure, is that public health officials were not exactly on the same level as the American public. Health officials presented their claims with far more certainty than the evidence warranted. Returning to why the “pandemic playbook,” which so many years of effort went into, turned out to be virtually useless, Nocera and McLean note:
A major problem for public health officials trying to combat COVID-19 was that it was a different kind of virus. All the government’s plans were made in anticipation of a flu pandemic. Especially in the first months, much less was known about how the coronavirus spread and how deadly it was. And Fauci was never willing to acknowledge that uncertainty.
I don’t think it’s entirely true to say that Anthony Fauci was never willing to acknowledge uncertainty. He often did that – but usually only afterwards, when he explained why he had changed his position on something. That’s fine in and of itself – we want government officials to change their minds after learning new information. But what Fauci was absolutely terrible at was acknowledging any degree of uncertainty at any given time, and especially allowing that a high degree of uncertainty about current circumstances meant that there was ample room for reasonable disagreement about current policy. Whenever any statement of his was resisted, the prospect that such resistance could be justified based on uncertainty disappeared, and those who disagreed with his position were described by him as motivated by “an anti-scientific bias that people are – for reasons that are unthinkable’. and not understandable – they just don’t believe in science and they don’t believe in authority.”
Take the issue of masking. In the early days of the coronavirus pandemic, many public health officials confidently stated to the public that wearing masks had no benefit in preventing transmission of the disease. Later it turned out that they were did think masks were beneficial in preventing the spread of the disease, but they worried that there wouldn’t be enough masks for medical workers if they openly acknowledged that. So to prevent people from rushing to stock up on the limited supply of masks and to ensure more would be available for hospital staff, they deliberately downplayed the value of masks, at least initially.
Then came a change of leadership from the top:
In April 2020, reversing its original position that no one needed a mask, the CDC said Americans should immediately start wearing masks, including cloth masks. Overnight, tens of millions of Americans began wearing them, and hundreds of entrepreneurs began marketing them, many of whom withdrew from their normal businesses, which had been shut down. But as more was learned about the coronavirus, some experts began to realize that cloth masks weren’t doing much good. “We’ve known for months that COVID-19 is airborne, so a simple cloth mask won’t cut it,” said Lena Wen, a professor of public health at George Washington University. Finally – Finally – In early 2022, nearly two years into the pandemic, the CDC recognized that “loosely woven fabrics provided the least protection” against the virus. That kind of grudging change didn’t inspire confidence.
Moreover, Dr. Fauci acknowledged at several points that his public statements were not intended to reflect what he actually believed to be true, but were instead tailored to what he thought would most effectively get people to do what he wanted. , even if what he said was not true or not justified by the evidence. Like Fauci said on his approach to vaccination rates:
When polls showed that only about half of all Americans would take a vaccine, I said herd immunity would last 70 to 75 percent… When newer surveys said 60 percent or more would take the vaccine, I thought, ‘I can take this one step further. little bit,” so I went to 80, 85.
(This especially reminds me of Bart Simpson’s famous quote: “I only lied because it was the easiest way to get what I wanted!”)
Perhaps in this and many other similar cases, public health officials felt it was their best move to put forward a sort of Noble Lie approach: “We’re not really sure that masks and lockdowns on the internet will be helpful. That could be possible, and we think it’s worth a try, but we’re not sure. But publicly acknowledging that uncertainty could undermine people’s willingness to accept either, so we should act as if things are settled and anyone who disagrees simply refuses to ‘know the science’ to follow’.”
But this creates something akin to what economists call a signal extraction problem. Once public health officials start making their statements based on more than what they know to be true, or based on things they actually know to be untrue, but are intended to move people in the “right” direction, they should have sent the signal in such a contaminated way. From then on, every time public health advice is given, people will ask themselves, “Okay, are they saying this because they actually believe it to be true, for good reasons?” Or do they exaggerate their certainty because they think this is the best way to get people to do what they want? Or do they say something they don’t actually believe, because they’re afraid an honest answer won’t get the response they want?”
It is common for people to point out that a serious problem in America is that people are losing faith in institutions. But it is worth asking whether this loss of trust is due to the Americans’ failure to show the institutions the proper trust they have earned, or whether the players running these institutions are failed to act in a reliable manner?
And trust in institutions can make a big difference. As Nocera and McLean describe in their book:
For comparison: [Dr. Jay] Bhattachary liked to use the example of Sweden. Sweden was controversial because it eschewed lockdowns and kept society running. But when vaccines became available, “Sweden got 97 percent of adults the vaccine without any mandate,” Bhattachary said. “Why? Because people trusted the government. And the reason they trusted the government was that officials were honest about what they knew and what they didn’t know. And they didn’t force people to do things that were beyond their ability.”
This decline in trust in institutions in America has been going on for a long time. As George Will put it in his book The conservative sensibility:
In 1964, 76 percent of Americans trusted the government to do the right thing “almost always or most of the time.” Today, less than 20 percent do. The former number is one reason [President Lyndon] Johnson did so much; the latter is a consequence of his actions.
I tend to think that the loss of trust in institutions is one of the biggest problems facing American society today. But I also believe that much of that trust has been lost because the elites believe in the institutions and act as if the masses have failed. them – ordinary people do not show the elites the kind of deference and deference that the elites believe they deserve.