Below my three articles the autumn issue of Regulationwhich has just been released in print and online, there are two reviews of recent books that, unsurprisingly, relate to individual freedom.
The first is about Matt Zwolinski and John Tomasi The Individualistswhich provides a detailed intellectual history of libertarianism since its birth in the 19th century (see pp. 40-43 in the magazine). In the authors’ typology, which is defensible, libertarianism in a broad sense includes not only the most radical libertarians, but also the contemporary version of classical libertarianism. It is a serious and well-researched book, which in many ways poses a challenge to libertarians and non-libertarians alike.
One of my criticisms concerns the neglect of Anthony de Jasay. I write:
There is a major absence in the book’s review of contemporary libertarian thought. Nowhere is the work of economist and political philosopher Anthony de Jasay mentioned. In my opinion, De Jasay has fundamentally renewed both the critique of the state and the liberal-libertarian argument for anarchy. (To see “A conservative anarchist? Antonius de Jasay, 1925–2019”, Spring 2019.) De Jasay’s work also weakens the relevance of the standard distinction between left and right, progressive and conservative, and sheds new light on political philosophy and libertarianism. Sure, he’s far from an academic household name, but his first, groundbreaking book, The statewas published four decades ago. Since I didn’t immediately recognize its importance (Buchanan was faster), I can’t really cast the first stone.
My review concludes:
Is libertarianism too big a tent, with too many different inhabitants? The authors of The Individualists believe that “libertarianism is not accidental but intrinsically a diverse ideology” and that “the tension between radical and reactionary elements is not accidental but intrinsic to libertarian thinking.” They seem to attribute this characteristic to the different circumstances in which the main threats to freedom changed. Perhaps it is also because libertarianism is defined along a different dimension than the standard left-right spectrum: the individual choice/collective choice dimension. Be that as it may, analysis, discussion, peaceful diversity and tolerance are pluses and not minuses. Zwolinski and Tomasi’s book is a useful guide to these interrogations.
The second book I review in this popular edition of Regulation is a defense of the Middle Ages as a precursor of classical liberalism: The Medieval Constitution of Liberty: Political Foundations of Liberalism in the West (to see pp. 51-54 in Regulation online) by two libertarian economists, Alexander William Salter and Andrew Young. The beginning of my review:
The Middle Ages seem mysterious. The period from the fall of Rome in the 5th century through the 15th century is often (or at least used to be) called the Dark Ages. Yet this period was followed by the Renaissance, the early modern period and, in the 18th and 19th centuries, the Enlightenment, the Industrial Revolution and (to borrow from Deirdre McCloskey) the ‘Great Enrichment’. There must have been something in the Middle Ages that did not conflict with the birth of modernity.
Salter and Young explain what that was. They also argue that we (in the West) do not owe the degree of freedom we have to the ‘state capacity’ (one of today’s academic buzzwords) that developed between the Middle Ages and the Second World War. the Enlightenment but, on the contrary, to the decentralized political power that characterized the High Middle Ages (11th-13th centuries). Let me quote the last few paragraphs of my review:
The medieval constitution did not last long after the High Middle Ages, mainly due to the shocks of the 14th century. The Black Death, a plague or viral epidemic, ravaged Europe between 1347 and 1351. Depending on the region, it killed between an eighth and two-thirds of the population. Another shock was the siege gun, which when coerced produced economies of scale and negated the relative advantage of fortified places. Centralized nation-states emerged with ‘state capacity’ for the production of what we would now call public goods.
State capacity scholars believe that the privatization of political authority in the High Middle Ages prevented the centralization of the state and the building of useful state capacity, especially for supporting economic growth. They point to the correlation between high taxes and high economic growth since the Industrial Revolution. (To see “A chained Leviathan that continues to wander and grow”, Fall 2021, and “A fashionable appeal to a benevolent state”, Winter 2023–2024.) An example of the perverse effects of decentralized medieval institutions can be found in the guilds, which limited innovation and competition among craftsmen, and existed from the 11th to the 18th century. Local tolls provide another example. Only the modern central state, the argument goes, was able to remove these obstacles to the Great Enrichment. Salter and Young see the state capacity argument as “a significant challenge” that they seek to address.
The explanation of state capacity for economic development has been challenged by several scholars, such as Peter Boettke, Roselino Candela, Vincent Geloso, Ennio Piano, and Salter and Young themselves. Strong states can be just as predatory as producers of public goods. Historically, state capacity has generally stifled economic development; we need only think of imperial China or, lately, North Korea or the Soviet Union. To sustain prosperity, state capacity must be limited by the rule of law and a market economy. The state must be limited in the use of its capacity. The march of Western countries towards the Great Enrichment suggests that something must have prevented state capacity from becoming predatory. Salter and Young argue that this was ‘the set of background constraints bequeathed by the constitutional heritage of medieval Europe.’
So we cannot explain ‘the abundance of modernity’ without considering the conditions that existed in the High Middle Ages. “The rise of the West should not be seen as an escape from the High Middle Ages,” the authors write, “but as a continuation of the proto-liberal traditions that strengthened in the High Middle Ages.”
Salter and Young’s book confirms that capitalism, or more generally, individual freedom, is the daughter of anarchy, or at least of polycentric and limited political power. Let us reiterate that the Middle Ages were not perfect and humanity had to wait until 19th century classical liberalism could glimpse the wealth that individual freedom could produce.
Sociologist and historian Jean Baechler said something similar (his emphasis):
The expansion of capitalism owes its origin and raison d’être to political anarchy.
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DALL-E hopes someone is listening