In earlier reports I have criticized ambiguity in foreign policy. I quoted the example of the Gulf War (1991), which took place because an American official Saddam Hussein gave the impression that we would not object to an invasion of Kuwait. That was clearly an incorrect signal, and as a result we were drawn into an expensive war. It also seems likely that the subsequent war in Iraq (2003) would not have taken place without the previous Gulf War. Saddam would almost certainly not have invaded Kuwait if the US has correctly explained the intended reaction before the invasion, because his mistake turned out to be very expensive.
Jordan Schneider and Jonathon Sine recently interviewed Sergey Radchenkowho had this to say about the events prior to the Korean war:
Kim Il-Sung in North Korea wanted to reunite the country and Stalin continues to ask for permission and said: “Comrade Stalin, the moment we cross the 38th parallel, there will be a revolution in South Korea. Everything will be fine. It will be very fast.” Stalin would refuse him to do that time and time again. The reason for this is quite clear – Stalin was worried about the American intervention. In this specific case he was a very careful person. . . .
The question is, why does Stalin change his mind by thinking that the Americans can intervene to think that they will not intervene? That is where it becomes complicated.
First of all we have Dean Acheson’s comments in the press conference, which are simple where he says, “America has a defensive perimeter that does not include Korea.” That is probably the most miserable statement ever made by an American foreign policy maker. In retrospect, that was a very bad idea. . . .
Even Mao herself did not know what was going on. Stalin did not inform him.
Then I see the reaction of Anastas Mikoyan, that is: “Our intelligence intercepted cables by the Americans who said they would not intervene in the conflict.”
The entire interview is quite interesting and worth reading.
If this claim is correct, there was a war that resulted in 3 million deaths because the US had an ambiguous policy with regard to our willingness to defend South Korea.
Certainly, it is possible that North Korea eventually invaded South Korea, even without the approval of Stalin. But if the invasion had been postponed for a few decades, it would have given the South more time to build its defense groups (perhaps with American help.)
So now we have two or even three wars that may have taken place because the US sent ambiguous signals to our willingness to defend different countries. Does this have some consequences for today?
Both the Biden and the Trump administrations have made it fairly clear that we will not use American troops to defend Ukraine. So I don’t see any great ambiguity on that front. But elsewhere, policy ambiguity is rising sharply.
The administration of Biden was strongly dedicated to NATO, which every member undertakes to defend the defense of other members if they are attacked. For example some NATO -members Helped the US in Afghanistan after the 9-11 attacks. President Trump has broadcast mixed signals on NATO, and therefore it is no longer clear that the US government is committed to this organization. This increases the risk of miscalculation in one or another place such as the Baltic region.
With regard to Taiwan there were mixed signals even within the Biden administration. President Biden would occasionally suggest that the US is committed to defending Taiwan if it was attacked, only to allow other administration officials to restrain these statements and to restore ‘strategic ambiguity’. President Trump, on the other hand, did not dedicate firmly to defend Taiwan.
In this post I try not to defend a particular Taiwan policy. (I am not a fan of the Biden or the Trump approach.). Instead, I try to describe how earlier examples of policy ambiguity have led to a number of expensive disasters in foreign policy, and it also appears that there has been a dramatic increase in policy uncertainty in recent years.
How can we have more transparency and clarity in the US foreign policy? An approach would be to return to the original intention of the Constitution and to have the congress decisions about whether or not to wage war. Because the Senate has 100 members, it is easier to predict her response to foreign aggression than to predict the reaction of a single individual (that is, the president). There is also the “wisdom of crowds”, who suggests that decisions of large groups are usually superior to those of a single person. (Rates are another area where the founders thought it was wise to give the Congress the authority.)
Ps. In general, it is logical to have a foreign policy that reduces the “cat risk” of extremely poor results. In my opinion, the war between mainland China and Taiwan would be very bad. But war between mainland China and the US can be different orders of size worse.
Pps. After written this message, I noticed that a number of top administration officials were caught discussing war plans for an uncertain signal chat with a reporter for the Atlantic Ocean, and then lied about it, even after the administration had confirmed the Atlantic story. There are so many other things going on that I suspect that this story will be forgotten within 24 hours. So many scandals, so little time. The chat messages revealed some things I was talking about:
For a continent already ensuring that Trump cannot honor a NATO article 5 request or be willing to shake up allies by keeping the spare parts and software upgrades needed to make their F-35 joint strike hunters fly the content of this unintended leakage discussion. . . .
We allies in the Asia -Pacific and the Middle East can only conclude that they can be this soon, if Trump and his officials ever decide that they do not pay enough for their defense or do enough trade concessions.
In the meantime, Russia and China will also draw conclusions, although this is viewed from their perspective, this offers exploitable opportunities. At least as important as all this is that both American friends and the enemies find out what happens if you get a group of poorly qualified ideologists to run the most powerful army in the world. The short answer is recklessness or, under a more generous interpretation, a group with a steep learning curve.
The chat discussion also revealed that when considering the advantages and disadvantages of this military action, the fact that it could also help Europe were seen as a negative. (No, I don’t joke.) As I keep saying, the US moved its alliance from the west to Putin’s Russia. Here is one Bloomberg -Story:
“Finlandization” is about weaker countries that have to give up sovereignty to appease stronger bullies, such as Russia and now the US.
A few years ago, commentators considered me an anti-American extremist for claiming that the American government was a “bully”. Now that image has become mainstream.